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CASE NOTE
FLASHING BADGES AND DESIGN - COPYRIGHT:

A

CASE

COMMENT
Manasvini Raj*

One ofthe mostfascinatingissues arisingin the arenaofintellectualproperty
rightsis the interfacebetween its variousforms, and policy issuesarisingout ofthe
expansionor restrictionofa country's IPR regime. This case note discusses the
recent decision in FlashingBadge which casts light on precisely these issues, and
lays down the parametersfor thefuture development ofjurisprudencein this area.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When a layman looks at attractive decorative items in gift stores like glittering
bells, glow-in-the-dark stickers or badges that flash, he never envisages that
their making and marketing process could cause tricky and complex design copyright spats! Yet, in the world of intellectual property rights, they do.
At the outset, one needs to understand what design rights cover. There is a
discernible difference between the inventive, functional products and processes
which fall into the ambit of patents on the one hand; and creative, artistic
copyright works on the other. However, many products which are neither
inventive nor constitute copyright works are marketed with features that have
an artistic, aesthetic or functional value. It is these features, either of the
appearance or arrangement of a commercially exploited article, which is the
subject of design rights.'
*
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Design rights occupy the gap in protection which would otherwise fall
between patents and copyright. 2 Colston succinctly explains this by pointing out
that if one were to consider that patents and copyright occupy the far ends of a
scale, moving from entirely functional (for e.g., an exhaust pipe), towards the
entirely artistic (works of art), design rights would occupy the median space? So,
design law sees design as features of shape or configuration which can either be
aesthetic or of a functional nature. Aesthetic designs are protected under the
provisions of the Registered Designs Act, 1949, while functional designs are
governed by the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988
[hereinafter "CDPA, 1988"]. This has always been an area of substantial
complexity, amongst other elements, due to the overlap with copyright law.4
Copyright subsists automatically in a qualifying artistic work, without
any particular requirement of artistic quality under the CDPA, 1988.5 First,
copyright can subsist in design documents, by protecting them as either artistic
or literary works. Secondly, copyright can subsist in the article, when articles are
most likely to fall within the categories of engraving,' sculpture,7 or works of
artistic craftsmanship.' To maintain a boundary between copyright and
industrial design, the CDPA, 1988 introduced limits to the application of copyright
protection to industrial designs. This ambivalent and ambiguous relationship
between copyright as a means of protecting designs and the diverse design rights
which prevent the unauthorized infringement of designs, depends largely on the
interpretation of Sections 51 and 52 of the CDPA, 1988 and has never been
satisfactorily resolved in English intellectual property law?
The case of FlashingBadge Co. Limited v. Groves (tia FlashingBadges by Virgo and

Virgo Distribution)" in particular has presented an opportunity to examine, albeit
in a critical fashion, the relationship between design right and copyright subsisting
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P. TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 315 (2001).
Baillie, Design Copyright Protection in the United Kingdom, 15 INT'L L. 92 (1981).
The mould for a frisbee in Wham-O v. Lincoln Industries, 1985 R.P.C. 127 (Ct. App.
New Zealand 1985).
The moulds for a sandwich toaster in Breville Europe v. Thorn EMI Domestic
Appliances, 1995 F.S.R 7 (Ch. Div. Patents Ct. 1985).
Furniture in Hensher v. Restawile, 1976 A.C. 64 (H.L.).
S. Gary, Protection of Designs: A New Regime, 14 NOTTINGHAM L.J. 30 (2005).
Flashing Badge Co. Limited v. Groves (t/a Flashing Badges by Virgo and Virgo
Distribution), [2007] EWHC 1372 (Ch) [hereinafter "Flashing Badge"].
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in industrial designs, with reference to s. 51 of the CDPA, 1988. According to Cornish,
"a degree ofuncertainty infects the penumbra ofs. 51"" and in this comment, I argue that
this uncertainty has not disappeared, even after the judgment in question.

II.

THE CASE AT HAND

Flashing Badge (the Claimant) commissioned a freelance artist to design
novelty badges, and the claimant thereafter bought the copyright from the artist.
There were twenty five badges, containing pictures and various messages such
as "Princess", "16 Today" etc., written in flamboyant script and with backing
cards. Each badge was in a distinctive style, with six flashing, battery powered
LEDs, which were positioned in such a manner, that the colour of the LED
complemented the colour of the badge design. Another key feature of each badge
was that its outline shape followed the outline of the artistic design (for example,
a key for "21 Today", and a crown shape for "Princess") which formed the face of
each badge. Mr. Groves (the Defendant) imported virtually identical copies of the
claimant's badges and backing cards from China. The Defendant admitted
infringement of copyright in the backing cards and the case turned on the
copyright issue in respect of the badge designs.
The claim for copyright infringement in respect of the badge designs was
disputed, although there was no dispute that the designs were artistic works in
which copyright subsisted. In particular, it was admitted by the defendant that
the message on each badge was a "graphic work", which is an "artistic work"
within the meaning of s. 4, CDPA, 1988.12 The defence was based exclusively on s.
51, CDPA, 1988.
The relevant provisions of s. 51 provide that:
(1) It is not an infringement of copyright in a design document or
model recording or embodying a design for anything other than an
artistic work or typeface to make an article to the design or to copy
an article made to the design.
"

12

W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 378 (1997).
AND PATENTs ACT 1988, §4 defines "Artistic Works":
(1) In this Part "artistic work" means(a) a graphic work, photograph, sculpture or collage, irrespective of artistic
quality, ...
(2) In this Part...

COPYRIGrr, DESIGNS

"graphic work" includes(a) any painting, drawing, diagram, map, chart or plan,
201

Vol. 22(1)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2010

(2) Nor...
(3) In this section - "design" means the design of any aspect of the
shape or configuration (whether internal or external) of the whole
or part of an article, other than surface decoration; and
"design document" means any record of a design, whether in the
form of a drawing, a written description, a photograph, data stored
in a computer or otherwise.
There were therefore three conditions to satisfy: first, whether there is a
design document; secondly, what this document embodies, i.e. either a design for
an artistic work or a design for something other than an artistic work; and finally,
"to make an article to the design or to copy an articlemade to the design".

III. THE

KEY CONSIDERATIONS

Counsel for the claimant admitted that the design or configuration of each
badge, apart from the artistic work on its face, was a design in respect of which s.
51 provided a defence.' An illustration was given of a design document for the
shape of a mug; and a subsequent drawing of a cow which would adorn the side of
the mug. In case the shape of the mug is copied, design rights might be infringed,
however, if the cow design is copied, (which is an artistic work), then copyright
would be infringed, and section 51 would provide no defence. 14 Furthermore, it
was submitted that the free lancer designed the artistic work with a particular
outline which would be applied to the badges and that the badges were subsequently
designed to follow the shape of the artistic work. Besides, since the original design
drawing was for "an artistic work", it was suggested that it did not fall within s. 51
because it was not a record for a design for something "other than an artistic work"
Lastly, counsel argued that the artistic work on the face of every badge qualified as
"surface decoration",thus excluded by section 51(3), which defines "design".'"
The defense counsel submitted that the design was not for an artistic work, but
was for an article, i.e. a badge, and was a drawing of the shape of that article, including
as part of its configuration the location of the LEDs. Further, it was suggested that
given that a badge is not an artistic work, it fell within s. 51, since the design drawing
showing the artwork was a "design document" for the purposes of s. 51(3)."
13
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IV. THE

HIGH COURT'S ANALYSIS

Granting summary judgment, Rimer, J.ruled against the defendant in respect
of all but one of the badges. In his view, each drawing was a "design document"
within the meaning of s. 51(3): they each incorporated a design for an artistic
work and a design for something other than an artistic work, i.e. an article in the
nature of a badge in the same outline shape as the artistic work.' S. 51, the Court
held, had no bearing upon the claims in respect of the first element of the design,
but was relevant to the latter element of the design, because that was a design for
something other than an artistic work.19 Further, according to s. 51(3), surface
decoration was excluded from the definition of "design". It followed that the s. 51(1)
defence applied, if at all, only to a copyright claim in the design minus the surface
decoration, but it offered no defence in respect of any infringement of the copyright
in the graphic design which provided the surface decoration of the badges. 20
The Court distinguished an existing Court of Appeals authority - Lambretta
Clothing Company Limited v. Teddy Smith (UK) Limited Next Retail Plc. 21 in which the s.
51 defence had succeeded. Jacob L.J who delivered the majority judgment in
Lambretta, had said that in that case, the designs (colourways of the Union flag)
could not have existed independently of the article to which they were applied (a
track suit top), since they were "neither physically nor conceptually" existing apart
from the shape, despite being surface decoration. Further he went on to explain
that the design drawing - a "graphicwork", in which copyright subsisted - clearly

fell within the definition of a "design document" under section 53(3), so section 51
prevented any infringement of copyright.
Rimer, J.said that contrary to the Lambretta case, the case at hand was such
that the pictures existed independently of the badge and could be applied to any
surface, and which, if so applied, would enjoy copyright protection for the
infringement of which s. 51 affords no defence? Rimer, J. interpreted all three
judgments in Lambretta in a congruent way, relying on the picture or logo (which
could have an independent existence of its own) example, cited by Jacob, L.J.
Mance, L.J had dissented on the availability of the defence in s. 51, because he held
that it was not essential to consider the design drawing as a whole for the purposes
18

FlashingBadge, 115.
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Lambretta Clothing Company Limited v. Teddy Smith (UK) Limited Next Retail Plc,
[2004] E.W.C.A. Civ. 886, [hereinafter "Lambretta"].
FlashingBadge, 1 22.
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of s. 51. In Rimer, J.'s opinion, however, Mance J. must have at least been in
agreement with Jacob, L.J., that s. 51 would provide no defence to the infringement
of copyright in a picture or logo, which could be applied to other substrates. 23 In
addition, Rimer, J. held that Sedley, L.J. must be read to have concurred with
Jacob, L.J.'s conclusion (i.e. that s. 51 applied to the colourways) but on the basis
that the colourways were a configuration rather than a surface decoration
inseparable from the shape or configuration of the track top. 24

V. HAS

THE FLASHING BADGE CASE STILL LEFT QUESTIONS
UNANSWERED WITH RESPECT TO

S. 51?

The new design right under the CDPA, 1988 aimed at replacing copyright
protection for purely functional articles. As a result, even spare parts like exhaust
pipes are now protected by UK unregistered design rights.2 5 This design right
subsists in the shape or configuration of the whole or part of an article. However,
copyright still subsists automatically in a qualifying artistic work. Where
copyright subsists, it may be infringed by indirect copying. 26 If the work is an
artistic one, it may also be infringed by the making of a three dimensional copy
from a two dimensional work and vice versa.2 7
If the article is not an artistic work, the first consideration is whether the
work is a design document, or a model recording or embodying a design. S. 51(1)
defines "design" in terms equivalent to the unregistered design right, and restricts it
to three dimensional features, excluding surface decoration. This exclusion of surface
decoration and the copyright protection therein, is crucial to the present comment.
Simon Clark in his skeptical comment of FlashingBadge takes an example of
a dress design to illustrate this point.28 The shape of the dress is three dimensional,
whereas the pattern used on the fabric is two dimensional. So the shape of the
dress falls within design right protection, as it is a feature of shape, whereas the
fabric pattern is two dimensional and should be protected by copyright. A
23
24
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FlashingBadge, 1 19.
FlashingBadge, 1 20. In doing so, Sedley, L.J. met with the broad definition given by
Pumfrey, J., in Mackie Designs Inc v. Behringer Specialised Studio Equipment (UK)
Ltd., [1999] R.P.C. 717, 721 (Ch. Div.) of configuration, i.e. the way elements are
arranged or assembled.
British Leyland v. Armstrong, [1986] R.P.C. 279 (House of Lords).
COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS AND PATENTS ACT
COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS AND PATENTS ACT

(1988), § 16(3)(b).
(1988), § 17(b).

S. Clark, A Distinction without a Difference, 173 C.W 23 (2007).
204

FlashingBadges and Design- Copyright:A Case Comment

noteworthy case is Jo Y Jo Ltd. v. Matalan Retail Ltd. 2 9 where the embroidery on
designs for cardigans was held to constitute surface decoration, being "the application
ofsome decorativeprocess to a pre - existing surface", although the claim failed on facts.

Features constituting part of the garment's construction and part of its fabric
were held not to comprise surface decoration. In fact, Mr. Justice Ratee said that
the case,
showed strikingly that, whereas a design may well be original in its
combination of shape and surface decoration, it may well yet fail to
attract protection because of the scheme adopted by the legislature
in the 1988 Act of treating separate aspects - shape and decoration
- as subject separately to the regimes of design right and copyright.
Subsequently, the Lambretta case took a slightly perplexing view. The Court
of Appeal there, confirmed (Jacob L.J delivering the majority judgment) that the
colour combination did not amount to configuration, within the definition of
design right, but rather was surface decoration and hence excluded by s. 51(3),
despite the garment being dyed through its thickness. In effect, that meant that
despite the colour patterns in Lambretta's tracksuit design being surface
decoration, so excluded from design rights, there was no independent artistic
copyright either, because they could not exist independently. S. 51 therefore
applied, excluding the patterns from copyright protection as well, leaving
Lambretta with no remedy against the defendant. The result of this decision was
that surface decoration was not protected by copyright, if the design for the
surface decoration was first created as part of the same design document as the
three-dimensional elements.3 oIn this context, Mance, L.J.'s dissent is noteworthy.
In the FlashingBadge case, the difficulty caused by Lambretta was clarified to a
certain extent, by Rimer, J.reconciling Lambretta'sthree judgments. The combined
experience of both the cases is that surface decoration cannot exist in the abstract,
as disconnected from the article to which it is applied; and section 51 applies to it
as well, in addition to applying to the shape or configuration of the article. 1
To differentiate between the two judgments, Rimer, J. said that Lambretta
turned on its "special facts" because the colours could not exist apart from the
shape of the garment. Accordingly, the surface decoration in Lambretta "could not be
29
30
31
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divorced from the design of the shape of the article." This is a convenient way of
circumventing the difficulties caused by the Lambretta judgment and has been
criticized.3 2 It does not however help, to understand how exactly, section 51
should be applied in the future.
Some questions are still left unanswered. Clark asks if there was really a
distinction between the two cases." Had the design of the badges consisted solely
of a combination of colours instead of a combination of colour, figures and words,
would the decision have been any different? Does it matter what came first? The
artistic works for surface decoration may have been created before the badges,
but had it been the other way round, as it was in the Lambretta case, would the
claimant in FlashingBadge have failed? What would have been the result if the
design document was three dimensional, with there being no apparent distinction
between the surface decoration and the shape, where the surface decoration
instead of being flat is textured?
Undoubtedly, s. 51 has not left muddy waters, and could do with some
clarity. Of guidance can be Etherton, J.'s judgment in the Lambretta case in the first
instance. There, Etherton, J. had rejected the argument of the claimant, stating
that the purpose of s. 51(1) was to achieve a mutual exclusivity between design
right and copyright, making matters excluded from design right (like surface
decoration) still enjoy copyright protection." According to him, the true effect of
the provision was that but for s. 51, the infringement of copyright in a design
document could take place in respect of any form of copying; with the exception
of simple photocopying of a design document. According to Etherton J., the
provision is to be restricted to situations where copyright protection would be
excluded in cases where unauthorized three-dimensional article is produced from
the design document. So with regard to the effect and purpose of ss. 51 and 52, the
natural and ordinary meaning of the words was considered as the approach to
take. Possibly, this literal and elegant approach, limiting the provision to strict
termsm could solve some of the complexities that s. 51 is ridden with.

3

Id.
S. Clark, A Distinction without a Difference, 173 C.W. 23 (2007).

3

Mark Wilkinson Furniture Ltd. v. Woodcraft Designs (Radcliff) Ltd., [1998] F.S.R. 63

3
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